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NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. v. Maine Public Utilities Commission et al.
Docket No. 08-674
Argument Date: November 3, 2009
From: The Seventh Circuit
by Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School
CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Federal Power Act requires that the rates for the transmission and sale of electricity in interstate 
commerce be just and reasonable. Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) must presume that rates set in freely negotiated wholesale-energy contracts meet the 
just and reasonable requirement. This presumption may be overcome only if the FERC concludes that the 
contract seriously harms the public interest. The Court is now asked whether the doctrine is inapplicable 
when a noncontracting third party challenges the rate. 
P U B L I C  U T I L I T I E S
Does the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine Apply When a Contract  
Is Challenged By a Noncontracting Third Party?
ISSUE
Is the Mobile-Sierra doctrine—which prohibits the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) from modifying or abrogating elec-
tricity and natural gas contracts unless they are shown to be contrary 
to the public interest—inapplicable when a contract is challenged by 
a non-contracting third party?
FACTS
In order to understand the lead-up to the current issues before the 
Court, it is first necessary to learn a little bit about the electricity 
industry. In this context, the term capacity refers to the ability to 
produce electricity as opposed to electricity itself. Utilities purchase 
capacity from generators to ensure that the system has adequate 
electricity resources to meet demand at all times, averting blackouts 
or other reliability problems. A utility that purchases capacity is es-
sentially paying to ensure that electricity is available whether or not 
that electricity is ultimately used. 
In a capacity market—as opposed to a wholesale electricity market—
the transmission provider (the entity that is purchasing the capacity) 
compensates the generator for the option of buying a specified quan-
tity of power irrespective of whether it ultimately buys the electricity. 
In order to maintain the reliability of the grid, transmission providers 
generally purchase more capacity than is necessary to meet their 
customers’ demand for electricity. This ensures that the transmission 
providers are able to respond adequately to unexpected fluctuations in 
demand.
New England’s electric utilities have long integrated their transmis-
sion systems so that capacity in one area can be used to meet demand 
elsewhere. In 1998, the utilities created an independent entity—ISO 
New England—to manage those systems. An independent system op-
erator is an independent company having operational control, but not 
ownership, of the transmission facilities owned by member utilities. 
For many years, New England’s capacity market has had numerous 
problems. In 2003, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission noted 
that the supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet New Eng-
land’s energy demand. The FERC, the generators, the transmission 
providers, and the power customers have made several attempts to 
address these issues. In 2003, a group of generators sought to enter 
into “Reliability Must-Run” agreements with the ISO-New England. 
Under a Must-Run agreement, a financially troubled generator in an 
area with supply shortages may recover up to its full cost-of-service in 
order to remain in operation. 
The FERC accepted the Must-Run agreements filed by the New  
England generators but only allowed those generators to recover 
certain maintenance costs, not their full cost-of-service. In its orders 
addressing the Must-Run agreements, the FERC simultaneously  
directed the ISO-New England to develop a new market mechanism 
that would include a location requirement. Such a requirement 
separately sets prices for various geographical subregions. Thus, 
prices would be highest in the regions with the most severe capacity 
shortages, which would encourage additional generators to enter the 
region and compete for business.
In response to the FERC’s directive, the ISO-New England proposed 
a “locational capacity” market structure in March 2004 that included 
four subregions, each of which would have a monthly auction for 
capacity. The auctions would be based on an administratively deter-
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mined demand curve that would establish the price and quantity of 
capacity that must be procured within each subregion. The FERC 
commended the ISO-New England for adopting a locational pricing 
mechanism that took account of transmission constraints between 
different subregions within New England. Because the demand 
curve proposed by the ISO-New England was extremely controversial, 
numerous parties submitted comments and testimony regarding the 
proper height and slope of the curve. The FERC set the matter for 
hearing before an administrative law judge.
In June 2005, the administrative law judge issued a 177-page order 
largely accepting the ISO-New England’s proposed demand curve. 
Several parties filed exceptions to this decision, arguing that the 
administrative law judge had wrongfully excluded evidence and had 
failed to respond to comments about flaws in the ISO-New England’s 
demand curve. On September 20, 2005, the full FERC heard argument 
and subsequently established settlement procedures.
After four months of negotiations involving 115 parties, a settlement 
was reached. Only eight of these parties opposed the final settle-
ment. The key feature of the settlement agreement was the Forward 
Capacity Market, which would replace the ISO-New England’s earlier 
proposal and eliminate the need for the controversial demand curve. 
Under the Forward Market, there would be annual auctions for capac-
ity held three years in advance of when the capacity would be needed. 
Each transmission provider would be required to purchase enough 
capacity to satisfy its installed capacity requirement, which is the 
minimum level of capacity necessary to maintain reliability on the 
grid. The Forward Market also included a locational component.
The most contentious issue regarding the Forward Market was the 
payments required from December 1, 2006, until June 1, 2010. The 
three-year lead time left a three-year gap between the first auction 
and the time when the capacity procured in that auction would be pro-
vided. The parties addressed this issue by negotiating a series of fixed 
payments to be paid to generators during the transition period. The 
agreement also provided that challenges to the transition payments 
and the final Forward Market auction clearing prices—regardless of 
whether the challenge is brought by a settling party, a nonsettling 
party, or the FERC—would be adjudicated under the highly deferen-
tial public interest standard rather than the usual just and reasonable 
standard. 
On June 16, 2006, the FERC approved the settlement agreement, find-
ing that, as a package, it presented a just and reasonable outcome for 
this proceeding consistent with the public interest. 
The Maine Public Utilities Commission and the Attorneys General of 
Connecticut and Massachusetts sought review in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, arguing that the FERC’s approval 
of the settlement was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and 
beyond the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction. Among other things they 
asserted that the FERC unlawfully accepted a Mobile-Sierra provision 
that imposed the deferential public interest standard of review on rate 
challenges brought by nonsettling parties.
The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine 
applies a deferential standard of review to preserve the terms of the 
bargain agreed to by contracting parties. When a rate challenge is 
brought by a noncontracting third party, the court held the Mobile-
Sierra doctrine does not apply; the proper standard of review remains 
the just-and-reasonable standard in section 206 of the Federal Power 
Act. Maine Public Utilities Com’n v. F.E.R.C., 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 
2008).
NRG Power Marketing, LLC, and other energy companies that have 
settled with the FERC petitioned the Supreme Court for review. 
CASE ANALYSIS
The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., grants the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce by public 
utilities. Under the Act, proposed rates for the sale or transmission of 
power within FERC’s jurisdiction must be just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential. 
The Federal Power Act provides that, when a party challenges a rate 
or charge, the FERC must adjudicate the challenge under the just-
and-reasonable standard. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine carves out an 
exception to this rule. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine originated in the 
Supreme Court’s twin decisions in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile 
Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and FPC v. Sierra Pacific 
Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). 
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine provides that when two or more parties 
reach a negotiated settlement over a disputed rate, the FERC applies 
a strong presumption that the settled rate is just and reasonable, and 
the FERC may only set aside the contract for the most compelling 
reasons. The purpose of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to preserve the 
benefits of the parties’ bargain as reflected in the contract, assuming 
that there was no reason to question what transpired at the contract 
formation stage. 
Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the FERC may abrogate or modify 
freely negotiated private contracts that set firm rates or establish a 
specific methodology for setting the rates for service only if required 
by the public interest. This doctrine recognizes the superior efficiency 
of private bargaining, and its purpose is to subordinate the statutory 
filing mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of contract law. 
Thus, when the parties to a rate dispute reach a contractual settle-
ment, the FERC must enforce the terms unless the public interest 
requires otherwise—that is, unless the negotiated rates might impair 
the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, might 
cast upon other customers an excessive burden, or might be unduly 
discriminatory. In this case, the Supreme Court is presented with 
a question of first impression: may the FERC approve a settlement 
agreement that applies the highly deferential public interest standard 
to rate challenges brought by noncontracting third parties?
Petitioners argue that the court of appeals’ rationale conflicts with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley. In Morgan Stanley 
Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish Coun-
ty, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the FERC can 
abrogate contract rates only in “extraordinary circumstances where 
the public will be severely harmed.” The court of appeals reasoned 
that applying the public-interest standard to nonparties would deprive 
them of their statutory right to review under the just-and-reasonable 
standard. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley 
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explains that Mobile-Sierra’s public-interest standard is merely one 
application of that just-and-reasonable standard—the one that gov-
erns contract rates. 
According to petitioners, the public-interest standard is a restriction 
on the FERC’s authority to abrogate contracts, not private parties’ au-
thority to challenge them. They contend the public-interest standard 
applies whether the FERC’s investigation is initiated in response to a 
contracting party’s complaint, in response to a noncontracting party’s 
complaint, or by the FERC acting sua sponte. Petitioners assert the 
public-interest standard was developed for the precise purpose of 
protecting the interests of noncontracting members of the public. 
Petitioners argue that the Supreme Court premised the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine on the sensible notion that rates negotiated by sophisticated 
buyers and sellers can be expected to be reasonable. According to 
petitioners, the expectation of reasonableness cannot logically vary 
with the identity of the person who challenges the rate. They say that 
contract rates agreed to in a competitive wholesale market can be 
expected to benefit consumers and other noncontracting parties, not 
just the contracting parties themselves.
It is the petitioners’ position that the court of appeals’ decision 
prevents Mobile-Sierra from providing any semblance of the contract 
stability the doctrine is supposed to provide—stability essential to 
critical infrastructure development. According to petitioners, a pre-
sumption protecting contract rates from just a few persons (contract-
ing counterparties) while allowing everyone else to challenge them 
free of Mobile-Sierra’s restrictions provides no stability at all.
Petitioners assert that the court of appeals’ decision rests on a 
misunderstanding of contract principles. They explain that applying 
Mobile-Sierra to a nonparty’s challenge does not bind the nonparty to 
the contract. They say the existence of the contract is simply a fact 
that makes the rate more likely to be reasonable. 
The FERC filed a brief arguing that it acted reasonably and within its 
statutory authority in approving, as just and reasonable, a comprehen-
sive settlement. The FERC points out that the settlement contained a 
provision stating that future challenges to certain rates established 
under the settlement would be governed by the public interest Mobile-
Sierra standard of review. According to the FERC, the court of appeals 
erred in setting aside the FERC’s exercise of discretion in approving 
this aspect of the settlement, as a result of two fundamental misun-
derstandings of the Mobile-Sierra standard.
First, the FERC claims the court of appeals erroneously believed 
the public-interest standard of Mobile-Sierra is applicable only to 
challenges to contract rates brought by contracting parties. Because 
it is the rate itself that is presumed just and reasonable, the FERC 
declares the presumption should apply irrespective of the identity of 
the party challenging the rate.
It is the FERC’s position that Morgan Stanley made clear that the 
Mobile-Sierra public-interest standard is not an exception to the 
statutory just-and-reasonable standard; it is an application of that 
standard in the context of rates set by contract. The FERC says it is 
the just-and-reasonable standard to involve an inquiry into the public 
interest in the context of future challenges to rates set under this 
settlement agreement. 
The FERC stresses that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the Federal Power Act’s just-and-reasonable standard leaves 
the FERC with considerable discretion in setting rates. The FERC 
says it properly exercised that discretion in determining that the 
public-interest standard should be applied here. Although the rates 
covered by the settlement’s public-interest review provision are not 
themselves contract rates to which the FERC was required to apply 
Mobile-Sierra, the FERC claims it carefully reviewed the settlement. 
As part of the review, the FERC claims it reasonably determined that 
the transition payments fell within a zone of reasonableness, that the 
auction process would produce just and reasonable rates, and that the 
interest in rate stability made the application of the public-interest 
test appropriate.
The respondents (including the Maine Public Utilities Commission 
and the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts) were 
parties to the contested FERC proceeding but object to the settlement 
agreement agreed to by other parties and approved by the FERC. They 
acknowledge that under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, freely negoti-
ated contracts by sophisticated buyers and sellers are presumed just 
and reasonable as between the two of them. When a party to such a 
contract challenges it, they say that the FERC may only provide relief 
if the party shows that the public interest, strictly defined, will be 
injured by the contract. In this case, however, the petitioners seek 
to use that public-interest standard to limit the respondents’ ability 
to challenge rates imposed under a settlement that the petitioners 
adopted, but to which the respondents objected. According to respon-
dents, applying the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in that manner would 
unmoor it from its foundations, converting it to a sword by which 
contracting parties can bind third parties to rates to which they  
never agreed.
Respondents assert the rates produced by the settlement are not 
“contract rates” to which the Mobile-Sierra presumption could apply 
in the first place. They claim the rates at issue in this proceeding are 
fundamentally different from the typical bilateral contracts that were 
at issue in Mobile, Sierra, and Morgan Stanley. They say the transition 
payments and the auction results are tariff rates of general applicabil-
ity throughout New England. Respondents argue the Mobile-Sierra 
public-interest standard applies only to rates arising from freely nego-
tiated private contracts, and not to tariff rates or to rates established 
as a result of a regulatory process. 
Even assuming the Mobile-Sierra doctrine could apply to general 
tariffs, respondents contend its presumption of reasonableness does 
not apply to challenges brought by entities that objected to the settle-
ment that produced the rates. Respondents explain the premise of the 
doctrine is that the sophisticated parties that enter wholesale energy 
contracts should be bound by their bargain, for they can be expected 
to negotiate a just-and-reasonable rate as between the two of them. 
Accordingly, respondents assert the doctrine restricts the ability of 
a contracting party to obtain regulatory relief from the obligations 
it voluntarily incurred. However, they argue the doctrine has no ap-
plication to efforts by contracting parties to bind third parties to the 
contractual terms. While the Federal Power Act properly holds a con-
tracting party to an improvident bargain, respondents say the statute 
cannot reasonably be construed as binding a nonsettling party to an 
improvident bargain to which it objected. They assert the nonsettling 
party is entitled to have the FERC review the rates under the ordinary 
just-and-reasonable standard.
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Responding to the argument that allowing nonparties to challenge 
contractual rates under the ordinary standard would eviscerate the 
Mobile-Sierra doctrine because “hordes” of consumers indirectly af-
fected by the rates would be able to file challenges, respondents point 
out that they are not “indirectly affected” parties. To the contrary, 
they say, the settlement created a tariff mechanism setting the terms 
and conditions of service for all market participants in New England, 
including respondents. Respondents argue that the Mobile-Sierra 
doctrine does not permit settling parties to contractually bind nonset-
tling third parties to limit their challenges to a tariff derived from the 
settlement rate mechanism simply because the parties have agreed 
among themselves that such challenges should be limited. 
Because the Mobile-Sierra doctrine does not apply to challenges by 
respondents to rates produced by the settlement, respondents say the 
court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed. Although FERC argues 
it has the authority to impose a Mobile-Sierra public-interest pre-
sumption in the absence of any contract from which such presump-
tion might arise, respondents state that the FERC did not expressly 
raise this argument in lower courts and did not assert it in its brief in 
opposition. Respondents state the Supreme Court should therefore af-
firm the Court of Appeals’ judgment without reaching this argument.
According to respondents, the FERC is also wrong when the FERC 
contends it has the discretion to apply a public-interest standard to 
challenges by respondents under its broad authority to approve  
contested settlement agreements it believes will produce just-and- 
reasonable rates. However, respondents claim neither the Federal 
Power Act nor any court precedent supports the proposition that  
the FERC may simply rewrite the terms of the Federal Power Authority 
based upon what the FERC believes may produce just-and-reasonable 
rates. While the FERC has the authority to establish or approve a 
mechanism to set capacity costs, respondents argue it does not have 
the discretion to abrogate the respondents’ statutory rights under the 
Federal Power Act. Respondents state the FERC is not permitted to 
use its discretion to determine that the public-interest standard may 
be applied outside a contract context.
Respondents argue petitioners also err in asserting that affirmance 
would threaten industry stability. Respondents stress that the narrow 
issue before the Supreme Court is whether an entity that objected 
to a settlement can challenge rates that are produced by the settle-
ment and imposed on them under the ordinary just-and-reasonable 
standard. According to respondents, a positive answer to the question 
will not undermine the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and the stability the 
doctrine advances. Respondents assert that, generally, parties that  
enter contracts understand that they generally cannot bind third par-
ties to the contractual terms. They point out the FERC has applied  
the Mobile-Sierra public-interest standard to nonparties only since 
2002, yet there is no evidence that industry stability was threatened 
before then.
SIGNIFICANCE
Petitioners assert that affirmance of the court of appeals’ decision 
would threaten industry stability. They suggest that without a  
guarantee that contract rates will almost never be modified,  
producers and utilities will not invest sufficiently in the nation’s 
energy infrastructure. 
On the other hand, respondents say that the Federal Power Act gives 
substantial protection against unwarranted modification of existing 
contracts. They suggest that applying Mobile-Sierra’s public-interest 
standard would make it significantly harder for dissenting energy 
companies to challenge the rates that are imposed on them and then 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law at Marquette University Law School 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Professor Grenig is the author of Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution published by Thomson Reuters/West. He is a 
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. He can be reached at 
igrenig@earthlink.net or 414.288.5377.
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